This essay connects Benedict Anderson's analysis of print capitalism as the enabling feature of modernity for the emergence of nationalism with an account of pre-modern sacral imaginings. It argues, following Bronislaw Szerszynski, that the contemporary post-modern ordering of the sacred vis-à-vis nature and culture designates a 'partial-return' to premodern imaginings and a reterritorialisation of religions which engenders emerging multiplicities and co-existing differences. It argues furthermore that the nation state (and its corollaries), an institution of modernity cannot adequately respond to the antagonisms generated by
INTRODUCTION
It has become customary to begin an explication of the concept of a nation and its various working definitions by expounding Benedict Anderson's three paradoxes in the introduction to his Imagined Communities. I will not deviate from this academic orthodoxy, especially since this paper assumes a broadly Andersonian stance vis-à-vis the concept of the nation, however I will give to the Andersonian treatment a neo-medieval thrust. I will argue, after providing some general remarks about the nature of the relationship between religious and national identity processes, especially in the context of European modernity, that the neo-medieval model of European unity (particularly regarding the European Union's eastward expansion) provides a post-secular alternative to national self-determination. I will ground this argument in an account of the origins of Albanian nationalism. Accordingly, Anderson articulates the following three insights about the antinomic nature of nations:
1 The objective modernity of nations to the historian's eye vs. their subjective antiquity in the eyes of nationalists; 2 The formal universality of nationality as socio-cultural concept -in the modern world everyone can, should, will 'have' a nationality, as he or she 'has' a gender -vs. the irremediable particularity of its concrete manifestations, such that, by definition, 'Greek' nationality is sui generis; 3 The 'political' power of nationalisms vs. their philosophical poverty and even incoherence (Anderson, 2006, p. 5) .
(1) is most immediately a statement on primordialism, the essentialist and essentialising view of nations as ancient and natural entities -which is rejected in this essay -as a necessary property of all nationalist ethnohistories, and it is what I am going to focus on. Consider the now famous example of Sukarno, the first Indonesian president, who spoke honestly about resisting 350 years of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia, even though the latter is an essentially 20 th century invention and the Dutch had only colonised its territories in the second half of the 19 th century. However more fundamentally it is a statement on not the historical existence of nations but their fundamental orientation vis-à-vis historical time. For one way to characterise modernity is as that which eventuates the passion for the new, as the era in which being modern becomes a fundamental
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value. This entails at the same time an orientation towards the future and towards the thinking of all political and moral ends in teleological or eschatological terms, which stands in opposition to the pre-modern orientation towards the past, especially when this is conceived as a relation to an originary beginning (such as original peace in Christianity). This is part of the reason why, as Hastings argues, Christianity was a condition for the possibility of 19 th century nationalism, whereas Islam's historical role was generally one of hindrance (Hastings, 1997, p. 165) .
Christianity is arguably in this sense the first 'modern' religion since it eschatologises its own original peace in more conspicuously historical terms and as Taylor points out, it has become difficult to think historically without this concept (Taylor, 2007, p. 129) . On the other hand, Löwith has argued convincingly that modernity distinguishes itself from both classical antiquity and Christianity with the full development of the 'modern' idea of progress (to which the nation and nationalism stand in an invariably ambiguous relation). For Löwith, this is partly because Christians are not a 'historical people' insofar as salvation history designates the salvation of individual souls and is therefore not connected to any conception of a nation (including in a pre-modern sense) (Löwith, 1957, p. 195) . Furthermore, modernity has been defined by its apparently permanent supplanting of the Aristotelian teleological modes of thought which characterised the Catholic middle ages so that, pace Hastings, the religious context of the beginnings of European nationalism much more plausibly designates the opposition between Catholic and Protestant influences, broadly identifiable as hindering and encouraging, respectively.
NATIONALISM AND RELIGIOUS MODES OF THOUGHT
One can see how the question of the relation between religion and nationality immediately enters the discussion (particularly in relation to ethno-national groups with religious content). For there is an important sense in which Anderson is right to claim that the 18 th century as well as marking the dawn of the age of nationalism (at least primarily in Western Europe) also marked the dusk of 'religious modes of thought' (Anderson, 2006, p. 11 ).
Needless to say, I am not claiming that the appearance of nationalism towards the end of the eighteenth century was 'produced' by the erosion of religious certainties, or that this erosion does not itself require a complex explanation. Nor am I suggesting that somehow nationalism historically 'supersedes' religion. What I am proposing is that nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with selfconsciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which -as well as against which -it came into being (Anderson, 2006, p. 12) .
However, one could plausibly make the weaker claim that nationalism responds to this erosion, thus generating the primordialist paradox since it is partly because of the loss of confidence in religious soteriological projects and this transformation of time (as both fundamentally forwardfacing as well as homogeneous and empty, to borrow from Benjamin)
that the national identity of the sort we are discussing becomes possible.
The enabling cultural productions of print capitalism notwithstanding, a
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223 number of intellectual developments which emerge in modernity make nations possible. This is already something acknowledged by Anderson, but perhaps not accordingly addressed in Imagined Communities (Anderson, 2006, p. 22) . The loss of confidence in religious soteriological projects had been underway since at least the time of
Francis Bacon (Bacon, 1965, pp. 350-351) Imagined communities existed before the nation, and the latter in some ways, as I hope to show through an analysis of its relationship to religion, constitutes a moment in the historical evolution of different orderings of the sacred.
PRE-MODERN IMAGININGS
The cultural systems which in the presently relevant sense preceded that of the nation were the religious community and the dynastic realm:
For both of these, in their heydays, were taken-for-granted frames of reference, very much as nationality is today. It is therefore essential to consider what gave these cultural systems their self-evident plausibility, and at the same time to underline certain key elements in their decomposition (Ibid., p. 12). irreducibility is a function of the impossibility of absolute face-to-face contact in even the smallest nation (Anderson, 2006, p. 6) . It follows that the imagining of national communities designates precisely this irreducibility, in so far as to imagine the nation is to imagine its irreducibility to its individual members, to think its limit and sovereignty (Ibid.) 26 . To suggest that nations can be understood in terms of how they order what they value and that these orderings should moreover be seen as developing out preceding orderings or the sacred which continue to be part of developments in the religious world is not to commit to a 
POST-MODERN IMAGININGS
But even if, following Gellner, we construe the nation as something invented by nationalism rather than construe nationalism as the self- War from which ensues the profound deepening of religious thought from Homer to Euripides (Bellah, 1964, p. 365 Not only is the supernatural realm "above" this world in terms of both value and control but both the supernatural and earthly worlds are themselves organized in terms of a religiously legitimated hierarchy. For the masses, at least, the new dualism is above all expressed in the difference between this world and the life after death (Bellah, 1964, p. 366 ).
The monotheistic sacred introduces a series of notions which become a key part of subsequent orderings of the sacred and Western civilisation number of subjects, extent of territory, and amount of revenue, he surpasses every sovereign that has heretofore been or that now is in the world.') And in the unselfconscious use of 'our' (which becomes 'their'), and the description of the faith of the Christians as 'truest,' rather than 'true,' we can detect the seeds of a territorialisation of faiths which foreshadows the language of many nationalists ('our' nation is 'the best'-in a competitive, comparative field) (Anderson, 2006, p. 17) .
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What Anderson doesn't point out is that this territorialisation of faiths is at least in part a re-territorialisation (as Debray has intimated) -further indication of the coincidence of the modern and primitive in the structure of nations and nationalisms. The monotheistic sacred of the historic religions, according to Bellah, effects a kind of 'demythologisation'
relative to the ordering of the archaic sacred (Bellah, 1964, p. 366) . This is true in so far as there can be no genuine henological sources of myth;
the one God has no myth. And it is somewhat made more convincing by the emergence of apophaticism in Christian theology, the proper Accordingly, the stretch of written Latin, Pali, Arabic, or
Chinese was, in theory, unlimited. (In fact, the deader the written language -the farther it was from speech -the better: in principle everyone has access to a pure world of signs.) (Anderson, 2006, p. 13 ).
Thus, one could also understand the difference between Christianity and
Islam in terms of their relationship to nationalism (one as 'constructor', the other as 'restrainer') in terms of the absence in the latter of the cultural productions of print capitalism (in the crucial early phases of its history).
The irony that the 'Scotist revolution' did not quite occur in Islam, but that Scotus himself was in a way theologising the work of the Islamic commentator on Aristotle Averroes should not be underappreciated (Hyman, 2010, p. 69) . But in any case, the early-modern ordering of the sacred described above gives way to the fully-fledged 'modern sacred' from within which nations and nationalism arise. Post-Scotist theology and subsequently Protestant thought is, in a manner which arguably is
235 anticipated in this kind of thought itself, heavily secularised, possibly with the neo-Stoicism of Justus Lipsius. The story is a long but one can trace its immediate effects in modernity:
The sixteenth century sees the taming of the unruly military aristocracy, and its domestication in court service, court attendance, or estate management. The eighteenth century begins to see the taming of the general population. Riots, peasant rebellions, social disorders begin to become rarer in Northwest Europe. Until we reach the rather high standards of non-violence which most Atlantic societies expect in their domestic life. And growing through all this development, partly driving it, partly strengthened by it, is a growing sense of our ability to put this kind of order in our lives. This confidence is at the heart of the various programmes of discipline, both individual and social; religious, economic and political, which begin to make us over from the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries. This confidence is consubstantial with the belief that we don't have to compromise, that we don't need complementarity, that the erecting of order doesn't need to acknowledge limits in any opposing principle of chaos. And because of this, this drive to order is both offended and rendered insecure by the traditional festivals of reversal. It cannot stomach the "world turned upside down" (Taylor, 2007, pp. 124-25) . 
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'Christian' world was changed, the Ottoman Empire was nonetheless subjected to a process of 'Westernisation' concordant with the secularising shifts of the modern sacred which affected the nationalisms of the countries under its control accordingly (and west of Constantinople this also included the imagining-processes of print capitalism).
Perhaps the most lucid illustration of this process is the Tanzimât Zielonka has observed, the EU's recent eastward expansion is an exercise in empire-building rather than a routine institutional operation (Zielonka, 2006, pp. 44-65) . Furthermore, such expansion has led to 'more layers of authority, more cultural, legal, and political pluralism, more diversified and crosscutting institutional arrangements' (Ibid., p.
3). The current debate between the two options for European integration, (Kayalı, 1997, pp. 72-74; Roshwald, 2001, p.106 
